

# Conceptual Distinction between Terror and Terrorism

Fred Perez

---

**Abstract:** In this paper I am offering the reader a conceptual framework for terror that is totally different from the traditional one attributed to terrorism. Among our expanding gallery of experts, terrorism experts are those trained to the highest level of professional incompetence when it comes to dealing with terror attacks. Unlike terrorism, which focuses on hidden networks and requires costly technologies and specialised knowledge (say, network analysis, group surveillance, infiltration), terror works on the side of reception as a magnifier of the terror act after it has been committed.

**Keywords:** Binary oppositions, binarisation, dualism, human rights, Guantanamo, Belmarsh, GCHQ, US PATRIOT Act 2001, UK Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, Draft Communications Data Bill 2012, Snoopers' Charter, Investigatory Powers Bill 2015, Investigatory Powers Act 2016, spy agencies, secrecy, terror, terrorism, Lee Rigby, Khalid Masood, Mohammed Emwazi, Jihadi John, James Bond.

---

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is what ETA/IRA do. These are hidden networks and secret organisations that bribe, deal, kidnap, torture, and kill. The damage they cause is often limited to family and friends of those kidnapped, tortured or killed. They produce and reproduce sectarian wars and vendettas. But they rarely enter into the collective consciousness of the host society<sup>1</sup> – unless, of course, they do it with hindsight in courtrooms and in fiction through films, documentaries and TV series. Because they use hidden networks, the capabilities of the security services are sufficient to deal with them. Yet, when it comes to terror, which is a cultural amplifier, the detonator, so to speak, of contemporary terrorism, their capabilities are totally ineffectual. For terror is open, transversal, overt, intangible, immaterial, and OTT; it is a pornography of representation which enters the collective consciousness of a whole society through popular culture and digital/internet media. IS (Islamic State) extremist Mohamed Emwazi (known as Jihadi John), for example, falls under the romantic doctrine of the autonomous, isolated, and solitary super-hero, whose absolute stance towards himself gives a world in which nothing is connecting to anything else. Dressed like a superhero, Jihadi John goes on about his business like Batman, Spider-man, Iron-man; these superheroes wear balaclavas and have superpowers that draw the attention of the authorities.

This may explain why the intelligence agencies faced fresh questions over their handling of Mohammed Emwazi. Some members of the public blamed MI5 blunders for allowing him to slip the net and go on to commit 'appalling and heinous crimes', as David Cameron put it, while others claimed that the British security services' past harassment of the IS murderer was in some way responsible for his radicalisation in the first place. Both positions are symptomatic of a psychotic society<sup>2</sup> that has lost its capacity to think. 'Unthinkingness'<sup>3</sup> disables the possibility of rich and varied

---

<sup>1</sup> By 'host society', I mean the extended target (rather than the intended target) of a terrorist attack. For example, the host society of attacks by ETA is the whole of Spain, and the host society of IRA attacks is the whole of the UK.

<sup>2</sup> A psychotic society is a society framed by a stringent moral code made of binary oppositions. See Fred Perez, 'Psychotic Society: An Introduction with a Glossary' in *International Journal of social Sciences and Humanities Research*, 5:1, pp. 403-418.

thoughts, guaranteeing the polarisation of the body of public opinion into two distinct and reciprocal pools of passions.<sup>4</sup> With its Conservative/Labour binary distinction, the UK parliament is the epitome of binarisation<sup>5</sup>. Among MPs, there are those who back the views of Tory MR Sir Gerald Howarth and Tory former shadow home secretary David Davis. They want the spy agencies and the police to do much more, to improve on a very poor performance so terror suspects are not 'able to slip through the net'. Their contention is that Britain's intelligence agencies are leaving known terrorists to carry out evil deeds through a flawed approach which focuses on disrupting rather than prosecuting suspects.

The man now known as 'Jihadi John' was on a terrorist watch list and a no-fly list but was not subjected to the more stringent restrictions of control order or a terrorist prevention investigation measure. Emwazi was able to evade surveillance, slip out of the UK using false papers and re-emerge in Syria in graphic propaganda videos (with his distinctive London accent and black garb revealing only his eyes) *where* he carried out the beheading of IS hostages, including the American journalists James Foley and Steven Sotloff in September 2014; the British aid workers David Haines and Alan Henning in September and October 2014; and the American aid worker Peter Kassig in November. He was seen again in January 2015 in a video of the beheadings of Japanese nationals Kenji Goto Jogo and Haruna Yukawa.

Tories Howarth & Davis' intervention came after David Cameron's pledge to use the full force of the British State to track down extremists 'anywhere in the world' who pose a threat to British citizens. Here the test for psychosis is asking the question: 'Where?' And the test comes out 'positive' when to the question '*where* is the terrorist?' the answer is 'anywhere in the world'. Notice how the answer is framed by the new hegemony of total annexation *where* everyone is caught up in the network and feels the irresistible pull of One<sup>6</sup> – which would be the equivalent in the human mental universe to those regions of space/time from which nothing can escape, not even light. Mental black holes do exist. They are compressed accumulations of the shared 'I/eyes' of individuals which look onto the moral code of a society. And they are places *where* ordinary mental gravity has become so extreme that it overwhelms all other mental forces. Its

---

<sup>3</sup> The term 'unthinkingness' refers to mental responses that are profoundly avoidant of thoughts, feelings, and places which have become the norm in affluent democracies. 'Unthinkingness' is living in an unreflective way, thinking by internal habit or external guidance, independently of one's own reason. But most fundamentally it refers to 'time' and to the impossibility of stopping when you go at 'speed' or you are in a 'hurry'. Agustín García Calvo realized, gorgeously contradicting himself, that time-cutting is the thing in need of most urgent review: 'Lo que se reconoce como urgente es más que nada no tener prisa, pararse un poco a recibir algo de calma y de sosiego.' ('What can be recognised as more urgent than other things is not to be in a hurry, to stop a little to receive some peace and quiet.') See *Comunicado urgente contra el despilfarro* (Comuna Antinacionalista Zamorana, Paris: Luis Manuel Rodríguez Editor, 1977). Also: 'It was this absence of thinking – which is so ordinary an experience in our everyday life, where we have hardly the time, let alone the inclination, to *stop* and think – that awakened my interest.' Hannah Arendt, Introduction to *The Life of the Mind*, One-Volume Edition (San Diego, London & New York: Harcourt, 1978), p. 4. 'Unthinkingness' is a borderline concept developed by Fred Perez from Calvo and Arendt to engage with the time/speed dimension of thought in a psychotic society. It is not that people have lost the capacity for thought; it is rather that people have lost the ability to 'stop and think'.

<sup>4</sup> For example, an in/out EU referendum or a native/immigrant\_love/hate binary choice; this kind of polarised passions brought Brexit to the UK and Trump to the White House.

<sup>5</sup> 'Binarisation' is the process by which the human mind can imagine only one side of a binary opposition; that is, the process of gradation, repression, consistency, transparency and value that gives mass to the moral code of a psychotic society. A vital component in the process of binarisation is the reader I/eye. This is an imaginary point from which the moral code made of binary oppositions is read. For example, in a simple code made of binary oppositions headed by good/bad, sun/moon, reason/passion, and white/black, the reader I/eye returns 'good, sun, reason, white' completely ignoring the existence of the other side; so 'bad, good, passion, black' is masked, repressed, downgraded, under-valued, and ignored. See Fred Perez, *op. cit.*

<sup>6</sup> The psychopathy of One can be expressed as: One/One is to a(=)a as One/Many is to exception/rule. a(=)a can be defined as the relationship '(=)' between 'a' and 'a', where 'a' can be either 'a' or the delusional 'a' which is more like a 'b' and where '(=)' being variable can be anything from 'wanting to be' / 'more or less equal to' / 'not completely being' to anything that can be similarly and randomly thought. '(=)' implies that two things cannot be exactly the same unless there is an observer imagining that they are the same. The first [qualitative, a(=)a=One/One] relationship is related to the 'identity' component of the psychotic desire, mania or obsession for total equality as read from the I/eye. The second [quantitative, exception/rule=One/Many] relationship is related to the extreme/borderline 'value' of the psychotic experience. It is about the rarity, uniqueness, exceptionality, oddity, scarcity, and life-changing potential of the psycho/semio experience. The I/eye is the site of sovereignty in a psychotic society; an imaginary point from which the moral code is read/shared and the binarised decision is taken.

gravitational pull marks the turn from domination to hegemony and from the neurotic to the psychotic. As Baudrillard put it:

It is the next phase of domination. I think it is worse, because hegemony brings domination, and therefore alienation, to an end. We are no longer alienated; alienation is no longer a problem. And yet we suffer. We have fallen into an irreversible vertigo; we are drawn to the black hole. We can sense the strategy but there is no one behind it. The black hole is what I call integral reality.<sup>7</sup>

Following Baudrillard's 'integral reality', the direction the Tories are taking is the 'total' one already taken by the US government since 2001, after the 9/11 attacks. In order to detain non-citizens suspected of terrorist activities anywhere in the world, the President issued special jurisdiction that authorised the Attorney General to detain every alien suspected of endangering national security (Patriot Act of October 26, 2001). What was new about Bush's order was that it radically altered the legal status of these individuals, producing new legal entities which could not be named or classified under the law.<sup>8</sup>

Legislators in the UK have always look back in awe and jealousy at such masterpiece of legal craftsmanship, attempting many approximations in the past 16 years, such as the Belmarsh indefinite detention regime<sup>9</sup>, control orders and, latterly, terrorism prevention and investigation measures.<sup>10</sup> These are alternatives to mass detention and internment Guantanamo style<sup>11</sup>, and none has involved monitoring more than 30 to 40 terror suspects at any one time. With around 2,000 persons of interest living in the UK, and MI5 just falling short of 4,000 staff – more than double than at the time of 9/11 – it cannot possibly mount effective surveillance of all the suspects. So the names in the list are risk assessed and prioritised. Low-level subjects of interest are referred to a new programme, Operation Danube, that deals with 'residual' risks. A dedicated team now exists looking at self-starters who are outside 'normal' terrorist networks and whose perfectly legal extremist politics may turn into violence and terror. The question for terror actions is the same as the one for suicides: framed by the action/thought binary opposition and prioritising action over thought (under the psychotic process of 'binarisation'<sup>12</sup>), the crucial point of discrimination for the police and the security services is between those who have thought about it and go no further, and those who put thought into action. A lot of people talk amateurishly about terror and terrorism, but to the professional members of the security services the knack is to identify those who will realise their fantasies and carry out terror attacks.

Asim Qureshi, Cage's research director, claims that MI5 was directly responsible for Emwazi's radicalisation have been echoed by those in society who think the security services' tactics worsen the terrorist threat. In taped interviews with Qureshi, Emwazi said he was asked by MI5 about his views on the 7/7 bombings in London, which claimed fifty-two lives, and on the 9/11 attacks which claimed around 3,000. How a quiet and studious London school boy, named Mohamed Emwazi, could become one of the world's most wanted men? When he was ten, 'Mo', as he liked to be called, was the boy who went to the school across the road (in Maida Vale, London). Among the list of his favourite things were chips, *S Club Seven*, *The Simpsons* and the best-selling Goosebumps book, *How to Kill a Monster*. His favourite computer game was *Duke Nukem: Time to Kill* – a game involving fights to the death in a downtown Los Angeles strip club where

<sup>7</sup> Jean Baudrillard, 'The Roots of Evil', in *The Agony of Power* (Los Angeles: semiotext(e), 2010), p. 117.

<sup>8</sup> In 2001, with the US PATRIOT and the UK Anti-terrorism Act 2001, euphemisms such as 'illegal combatants', 'extraordinary rendition', or 'enhanced interrogation techniques' show a deep insensibility to the deference of the Law towards certainty, while at the same time they are part and parcel of a debate within the international intellectual community about the increasing gap between words/concepts/categories and what actually happens in real life.

<sup>9</sup> See UK *Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001*. The most serious condemnation of or revolt against the UK Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 was the Belmarsh decision led by Lord Bingham of Cornhill – more formally known as *A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department* [2004] UKHL 56.

<sup>10</sup> See *Revised Prevent Duty Guidance for England and Wales: Guidance for specified authorities in England and Wales on the duty in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism* (Crown Copyright, 2015). See also the *Draft Communications Data Bill* (2012), the *Draft Investigatory Powers Bill* (2015), and the *Investigatory Powers Act* (2016); all nicknamed snoopers' charters by their opponents.

<sup>11</sup> The most recent attempt by the UK government to go back to Guantanamo-style internment is the 'jihadi prison block' which is to open in Durham 'amid fears that a growing number of criminals are leaving British jails with extremist views'. See 'Prison to get Britain's first Islamist terrorist-only wing' in *The Guardian*, 1 April 2017, p. 5.

<sup>12</sup> See note 5.

dancers change from women to mutated pigs. A supporter of Manchester United, his real passion in life was football and the thing he wanted most was to become a professional footballer. The interesting feature of this report is its 'normality'; millions of schools kids across Britain would fit this profile. How many young men in England do not want to be professional footballers? And this integral reality, the 'I want to be a professional footballer' as the signature of this new hegemony, is frightening because neither kids nor adults can resist it. There is no hope in trying to resist this hegemony with the tools we once used against domination – civil disobedience, critical thought, street demonstrations, etc. Why? Because 'hope' fits well with the old democratic regime and its master/slave narrative, but has no 'real' place in the new hegemony – except as a hyper-real/psychotic delusion that desperately clings to the symbolic dual order which rules over the moral code.

The lone wolf might be a psychopath or a serial killer: he doesn't hide his activities; on the contrary, he likes to show the world what he's capable of. He publicises his achievements. He gives away his location, his plans, and his targets. 'Come and get me,' he says to the authorities. While the terrorist focuses his efforts on the side of production of the terrorist act, the terror practitioner/pornographer directs his efforts to the reception of the terror act. An information society makes a 'good' audience for the terror act. But it makes a 'bad' audience for the terrorist act. Why? Because the collective mind set of our society is extremely vulnerable to the psychopathy of One – since it works by accumulation and refinement. So it reacts more traumatically to a single act of terror committed by a single individual than to many separate acts committed by a terrorist group.

Basically, an information society is a psychotic society because it is built on *small patterns*. Whether algorithm-based or related to the moral code<sup>13</sup>, 'everything' that exists in a psychotic society is 'a bias towards everything' caused by mental patterning in our minds under a(=)a. Even 'time' may be considered as a dubious category since its binarisation with space proves that it is a psychotic event 'felt' only by the mind. The binary before/after doesn't exist either. As inforgs, we are part of 'a space made of information, the infosphere, where memory as registration and timeless preservation (the Platonic view) is replaced by memory as accumulation and refinement. It is an environment characterised by its time-friendliness: times adds value and Web 2.0 applications get better by use, that is, they improve with age, not least because the number of people involved is constantly increasing.'<sup>14</sup> Yet, cumulative time-friendliness results in a time impasse by the accumulation of instances of the same and the similar.<sup>15</sup>

The lower the number of people involved in a terror attack and the shorter the time of preparation/execution the less chance there is of stopping it using the new communication and information technologies. Paradoxically, one single individual armed with a knife and framing his attack with a well-established cultural pattern (as seen in film, video, TV, or social media) can have a much bigger effect than a large group of individuals engaged in a covert operation. Perhaps this explains why none of the 22 successful terrorist acts in Northern Ireland since the Good Friday Agreement (April 10<sup>th</sup>, 1998) has had any impact in mainland UK.

Contemporary terror isn't secret. It is open, overt and OTT. So why does the spy agencies need to be so secretive? GCHQ, for example, is the UK Government Communications Headquarters. Their website says: 'The threats we face are devised in secret so the methods used to combat them must also be developed in secret. Failing to do so could place the lives of UK citizens at home and abroad in increased danger.'<sup>16</sup> Our moral code leaves only a single way for it to be right for

<sup>13</sup> An algorithm is a mathematical construct with 'a finite, abstract, effective, compound control structure, imperatively given, accomplishing a given purpose under given provisions.' R.K. Hill, 'What an algorithm is' in *Philosophy & Technology* 29:1, (2015), p. 47. In order to take certain actions and have particular effects, algorithms must be implemented and executed by/into a technology configured for a specific task. The moral code is made of binary oppositions that are read from the I/eye. The moral code is a hybrid zone where message and messenger coincide. The message is a default language made of binary oppositions which substitutes Law, Sovereignty, Social Contract and any other universal formula inherited from the Enlightenment. In Foucaultian terms, the binary message would be a procedure or technique of governability, whereas the messenger (the I/eye) would be a psycho-instrument that enables processes and practices of subjectivation.

<sup>14</sup> Luciano Floridi, 'Web 2.0 vs. The Semantic Web: A Philosophical Assessment', *Episteme*, 6:1, February 2009, p. 32.

<sup>15</sup> For quantitative/qualitative relations see Hegel's *Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences, Part 1. The Logic*, secs.107-111.

<sup>16</sup> This argument is based on the dangerous assumption that terror and counter-terror must use the same language. To me, this assertion falls under the psychopathy of One because 'secret' is a form of non-communication. Nevertheless, GCHQ's argument is extremely interesting. In the 'Disputation of Barcelona' (20–24 July 1263), Nahmanides sets up the

GCHQ to dupe the taxpayer into believing that their money has been well spent to make them and their families safe through methods devised in 'secret'. Given that 'secret' means 'non-communication', it is an irrational tool for an information and communication agency to use. Further, when terror acts are committed by a single individual, the first insidious question the agencies need to ask – but always avoid asking – is: how can a single attacker can cause so much damage to so many? Or, how can so many be harmed by so few? (adapting Churchill's famous words) This is a 'reception-based' question, because it focuses on the effects rather than the causes of the terror act; quite different from the terrorism-related question, which is a 'production-based' definitional 'wh-...' question, such as 'where are they?' Well, these people and their whereabouts can be found using network analysis. What we call link analysis or network analysis is the absolutely critical tool in finding covert/hidden networks, terrorists or crime networks. However, it is useless to ask *why*, *what*, *where*, or *who* when we are dealing with acts of terror. If intelligence chiefs and politicians confuse terror with terrorism, it is because they don't have the conceptual distinction. A psychotic society is an 'unthinking' society, incapable of producing thinkers who can come up with a practical conceptual distinction.

It is at this point in my train of thought that an overwhelming sadness takes over me. Because I could feel a deep emotion when I first heard the beautiful words of the Dean of Westminster and yet I could also sense their futility. It is as if the horror and the terror of Khalid Masood's actions could only be expressed in poetry. When the survivors of the Westminster terror attack were reunited for a multi-faith Service of Hope on 5 April 2017, the Dean said: 'What could possibly motivate a man to hire a car, and take it from Birmingham to Brighton to London, and then drive it fast at people he'd never met, couldn't possibly know, against whom he had no reason to hate them, and then to run at the gates of the Palace of Westminster to cause another death. We weep for the violence, for the hatred, for the loss of life. For all that divides and spoils our world.' Sadly, the Dean of Westminster was asking one of those definitional 'wh-...' questions that lead nowhere in the case of terror: Why? Why did he do it?

By their inability to stop and think, spy technicians have reacted to individual terror threats in the same way as they have reacted to terrorism in the past – with mass-data collections. It doesn't help either that the gravity of One manifests itself in the psychopathy of a society that focuses on Islamist ideology alone, as if the Salafi <sup>17</sup> mentality weren't just one factor of a complex and multifaceted problem. Because most Western democratic states so overtly target Muslims in such an 'unthinking' manner (without acknowledging subtle distinctions and key concepts and ideas), many communities in the EU, the UK and the US, feel unnecessarily victimised, especially as their local far-right persecutors are not being challenged in a similar manner. A favourite theme for those who want to attack Islam and Muslims is to assume that Muslim women are oppressed. The criticism usually takes simplistic forms such as women being forced to cover from head to toe not to incite lust in men and to hide the marks from beatings; or that she will be stoned to death if she is raped, or that she will not be educated so she cannot think herself to be cleverer than/superior to men, or independent from them. These are all lies for little children. Usuk's <sup>18</sup> Islamophobic discrediting agenda <sup>19</sup> and the culture of unthinkingness it generates are undoubtedly contributing towards a style of spying that approximates to the James Bond movies.

---

conditions for thinking in an unthinking world, which are the same conditions that would enable Jews to survive in a non-Jewish world; which are similar to the conditions that might enable humans to live peacefully in the transnational neuroworld of the future. The first condition for thinking is to delight in debating and challenging everything written, said and thought, regardless of the authority and power of those who wrote it, said it, or thought it. If Nahmanides hadn't been intellectually and spiritually courageous, he wouldn't have dared to stand up alone and helpless before the immense power of the medieval Roman Catholic Church and the secular power of the king. The second condition for thinking is to speak freely. Total freedom of expression must include the right to give offence. Nahmanides couldn't speak freely without uttering blasphemies; and yet he wasn't killed on the spot. The third condition for thinking is to agree on what is essential, putting our confidence on a shared language which should be popular rather than learned. We cannot argue about something if that something means a different thing for you and for me; and a different thing for our audience. In the Disputation, that something was the messiah, and the question of the messiah was not only not essential for the Jews but also their messiah was completely different from the Christian's messiah. The Christians were arguing about two different things as if they were one and the same. Without a common ontology or agreement to use the shared vocabulary in a coherent and consistent manner there could be no real communication between the two sides.

<sup>17</sup> The Salafi mentality, like that of many other radical Islamic movements (Taliban, Saudi-rooted Wahhabism, al-Qaeda), is characterised by conservatism, fatalism, inflexibility, uncompromising dogmatism, literalism, intolerance and antipluralism: there is only one truth (haqiqah) and this is the belief in the Holy Scripture and the traditions of the Prophet (Hadith).

<sup>18</sup> Usuk stands for the United States of America and the United Kingdom as if they were united into a single transatlantic country. Of course, no such country exists!

Because neither terror nor counter-terror are meant to succeed, it is vital to recognize that the professional practice of contemporary spies cannot be credited with the total elimination of old forms of terrorism nor should it be blamed for the increased expectancy of new forms of terror. For more than a century, analysis of old forms of terrorism has shown that geopolitical factors are the primary determinants of organised violence. Political geography, cultural biases, sociopolitical inequalities, guettoisation/apartheid and uneven imperialist/colonialist policies made it possible for a group of radicals to rise against oppression. This is the case of ETA and IRA, Mau Mau and Hezbollah.<sup>20</sup>

But the advent of Web 2.0 and cloud technology has made terrorist groups increasingly vulnerable to infiltration by the security services. Mass-surveillance and network analysis are pretty effective tools when it comes to detect terrorist activity. Because these new tools, like everything else in an information society, work through accumulation and refinement, the larger the terrorist group the better the definition of targets and the refinement of the analysis. The smaller the terrorist group the more difficult it is to pinpoint meaningful targets and to get a clear picture from the network analysis. Let me use a bit of geometry to explain the psycho-mathematical relation between terror and terrorism. If terror is a point, terrorism is a circle. Terror as a point can be seen as the degenerate circle of terrorism when its radius reaches Zero. Yet Zero cannot geometrically behave on behalf of the circle nor act instead of it. So terror can stand for terrorism only via a 'psychotic leap' – which is akin to magic.<sup>21</sup>

The Snowden scandal revealed an excess of surveillance in the name of Good that was giving shape to an even greater and more frightening Evil than the terror/terrorism they saw happening everywhere. Relative Evil and absolute Evil are two realities absolutely and reciprocally incommensurable among themselves; like terrorism (relative) and terror (absolute), they can only be bridged through a psychotic leap. Under the Law of One [ $a(=)a$ ], the balance between One side (a) and the Other (a/b) is re-assured through the variable equal sign (=) where the observer can input her curvature, her dis-symmetry. 'By taking the curvature of Evil, Good is degraded; it decomposes, it self-destructs,' says Baudrillard.<sup>22</sup> Global power, more than just the archetypical US 'war on terror', has no symbolic response to terrorism because in order to respond it must leap (psychotically). A symbolic response would wager its own death against each act of suicidal destruction. The US responds with a referent moving physically and muscularly on the ground with complete autonomy from any referential meaning: military action in the name of Good against the forces of Evil.

Perhaps this explains why most technical interventions by security services in terror cases have been 'absolute'. Because they are totally disproportionate and unrelated to the reality on the ground, these interventions represent a considerable risk to society which far outweighs any proven benefit. For example, the latest counter-terrorist operation launched by the UK security services in the wake of Khalid Masood's 82-seconds rampage in Westminster Parliament resulted in 11 arrests after raids across the country.<sup>23</sup> Of the 11 suspects, 10 were released without charges soon after their arrest. Only one man remained in custody on suspicion of preparation of terrorist acts. But he was released with no further action on Saturday 1 April 2017.

---

<sup>19</sup> In the face of the current populist hate for Muslims, and in the wake of a rising tide of reported antisemitism and hate crime, it is more important than ever before in previous history for Jewish individuals or groups, whether secular, liberal, Sephardi, Ashkenazi, Mizrahi, Ethiopian, Reform, Orthodox, socialists, or conservative, to join forces with Muslims, seeking to make a common front against illiberal Western policies. Our very existence now depends on the survival of unpopular liberal principles.

<sup>20</sup> Regarding the history of terrorism, two ground-breaking books have been published recently: Richard English, *Does Terrorism Work? A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), and Jonathan Powell, *Talking to Terrorists: How to End Armed Conflicts* (London: Penguin, 2014). See also John Bew, Martyn Frampton, Iñigo Gurruchaga, *Talking to Terrorists: Making Peace in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country* (London: C Hurst & Co Publishers, 2009).

<sup>21</sup> A 'psychotic leap' bridges the infinite and the finite; transforming reality into a manageable set of signals, limiting and eliminating the damaging fuzziness of the world around us; a world that would kill us if we were to stand mentally alone and psychotically naked in front of it.

<sup>22</sup> Jean Baudrillard, 'The Roots of Evil' in *The Agony of Power* (Los Angeles: Semotext (e) Intervention Series, 2011), p.13.

<sup>23</sup> On 22/03/2017, Khalid Masood ploughed into pedestrians on Westminster Bridge with a hired car at 76mph killing 3 and injuring about 50. Then he rammed the car into the railings of the Palace of Westminster and ran to the New Palace Yard fatally stabbing PC Keith Palmer. He was finally shot dead by a bodyguard of Michael Fallon, the defence secretary. Apparently, Masood logged into WhatsApp minutes before his attack - thus the interest of Amber Rudd, the home secretary, in defying the laws of mathematics by intercepting end-to-end encryption.

If the security services' original assumption that Masood had many accomplices betrays their terror illiteracy, the home secretary's reaction to the attack on TV is an embarrassing reminder of how many people in positions of power are technologically illiterate. Speaking on the Andrew Marr Show <sup>24</sup>, the UK home secretary, Amber Rudd, said that encrypted services like WhatsApp provided a hiding place for terrorists and demanded that these services give backdoor access to the police and the secret services. The truth is that it would be absolutely impossible to decode intercepts which are encrypted on the sender's phone and decrypted on the recipient's using pairs of public and private keys, unless you are God. What this proves is that the security services and their political masters might be experts in terrorism, but they are clueless about how terror works in the information age.

In defence of these terror-and-technology defectives, one must say that nothing could have prepared them for the naked truth: the most deadly terror attack in the UK since 7/7 was perpetrated by a single individual. Yet its effects were not just 5 dead and 50 injured but a total distrust by the public in the ability of the UK government and its secret services to stop such attacks in the future. Both the agencies and the public are beginning to be convinced that a simple plot (made of a hired vehicle, a knife and a deranged man who fits into no easy pattern) cannot be stopped. But do we need to live with that unhappy fact? The public needs to understand what the new threat is: terror – as different from terrorism. Unlike terrorism, terror has a psychotic edge to it which is difficult to accept and understand because it taps into the new hyperreality inhabited by the citizens of the information society – which is also a psychotic society that reacts to the attack in ways that are both disproportionate and disconnected to the reality to which it refers.

The further terror is removed from its physical source, the more it relies on 'vigilance' to aggravate its spectre. Delusion, psychosis, paranoia, fear and, above all, a narrowing of the gap between reality and fantasy (psychoticised as a higher category of thought called 'experience') are required from the public, the media and the politicians for terror to work. Psychotic power reigns and moves about in a space without reference, except to itself. Because semio-terror cannot be measured by accumulation or linear verticality/horizontality, everyday reality leaps in front of one's eyes/Is, fusing different dimensions into one hegemonic ultra-reality.

Psychotic societies are deluded to the point of believing that terrorists can occupy their territories and topple their governments. But the poverty of the means used to obtain such spectacular results is inconceivable to reason. Terrorists can damage some property, plant a few bombs, kill a few people, but their criminal actions are hardly comparable with those perpetrated by the regular armies of Western democracies which are currently operating in large swaths of Africa and the Middle East with devastating consequences. The insolence and brutality of revenge by Western democratic states (in the same manner when one indulges in furious violence without check and restraint) is quite detestable. Yet it is admired in some quarters that noble and generous resentment which governs people's indignation when naturally and automatically translates into raining bombs on civilians in poor countries in response to terror/terrorist attacks.

## 2. CONCLUSION

This research paper should not be used to attack the actions of the secret services. Rather, it is meant to spur conversation about what would be appropriate and necessary security against terror attacks. As each terror situation is unique and lies beyond the agencies' traditional field of expertise (terrorism), the public and the agencies should determine an appropriate plan together by sharing information. So the panic of dissolution of the spy agencies might be out of place. However, any serious public discussion on the reform of the spy agencies should begin with an insistence on the demystification of the secret services, especially with the separation of the reality from the fiction of spying, as portrayed in films and TV series.

Conspicuous and irrational terror attacks perpetrated by a single individual serve as powerful devices to convince people that they should pay more taxes to give spies the necessary tools to perform the miracle of stopping such attacks from happening in the first place. The prestige of the James Bond brand is used to intensify a nationwide addiction to a therapeutic relationship with this fictional character which is essentially pathogenic on a level as deep as the psychotic but not, for this reason, any less real. What is really dangerous is a passive public which has come to believe that 'a familiarity with James Bond and the ability to shoot' might help to secure a job in the secret services. <sup>25</sup> More mental damage is caused by people's belief that they cannot cope with terror unless they rely on 007 than terrorists could ever cause by exploding a few bombs.

<sup>24</sup> *Andrew Marr Show*, BBC1, 26 March 2017.

<sup>25</sup> 'The New MI6: less white and less like Bond' in *The Guardian*, 3 March 2017, p. 1.

The crisis of trust in the real intelligence agencies sparked by Iraq's faulty intelligence and the Snowden revelations can allow lay people to reclaim their own control over the James Bond delusion. The laicisation of the services could lead to a delegitimizing of extrajudicial practices such as assassination and torture, which are such a fundamental part of the James Bond myth. It can also help people to find a balance between the supposed 'family safety'<sup>26</sup> provided by the security services on the one hand, and individual freedom and human rights on the other hand. My point is that the layman and not the spy has the potential to stop the current terror epidemic by sharing information. This is why I am offering the reader a conceptual framework for terror that is totally different from the traditional one attributed to terrorism. Among our expanding gallery of experts, terrorism experts are those trained to the highest level of professional incompetence when it comes to dealing with terror attacks. Unlike terrorism, which focuses on hidden networks and requires costly technologies and specialised knowledge (say, network analysis, group surveillance, infiltration), terror works on the side of reception as a magnifier of the terror act after it has been committed. So it is not about money. It is more about effects than causes. And, paradoxically, it is less about Many than One.<sup>27</sup>

What matters here is not the psychopathy of the perpetrator but the psychopathy of the society that reads the terror attack. As we have seen in the Berlin Christmas market attack last year and in the Nice summer attack, a pattern is emerging where the primary weapon used is a hired or stolen vehicle, and the secondary weapon is a knife or a gun. These are hardly sophisticated attacks. The type of terrorist actions that can be stopped are group attacks with more than one member and a certain degree of preparation and sophistication. There are no remedies, legal or otherwise, for a moment of madness. This is why jurists don't regulate the exception.<sup>28</sup> Trying to regulate the exception with extrajudicial measures, programmes of mass-surveillance and investigatory-powers legislation is a clear symptom of psychopathy by a society that has lost the ability to stop and think.

Most of the legislation that I have superficially covered in this paper was produced by Usuk as a reaction to terror and terrorism. Sadly, these well-meaning legislators were not aware of the difference between terror and terrorism when they drafted these laws. Nor did they consider the possibility of a 300-year-old path towards democratic rights and freedoms reaching a cliff edge after 9/11. You don't have to be a lawyer to see the horror behind pioneering legislation such as the US Patriot Act of 26 October 2001, which allowed indiscriminate surveillance and snooping, house searches, control of correspondence of individuals, groups, and companies, indefinite and preventive detentions, confiscation of property, the freezing of assets, and the use of enhanced interrogation techniques. In a similar vein, on the other side of the Atlantic, 'part 4' of the UK Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 established that a terrorist suspect could be imprisoned for an open-ended period on the say-so of a government minister without having being convicted of a criminal offence following a fair trial in an independent court of law. Even though part 4 of the Anti-terrorism Act 2001 was repealed after the Belmarsh decision, there is still a governmental tendency to overreact to terror attacks by rushing draconian pieces of legislation through parliament.

The Investigatory Powers Act 2006 is the latest and most sophisticated attempt to date by a UK government to divert attention from their intelligence failures to Gafa<sup>29</sup>, so they can take the blame. Facebook and WhatsApp have already

<sup>26</sup> Supposedly, the government and its agencies must get on with the business of making difficult decisions in order 'to keep you and your family safe'. See section 16 (Extremism Bill) of the Queen's Speech delivered from the Lords Chamber on Wednesday 27 May 2015. Family safety designates the range of autonomy within which a member of the social mass exercises control over his own reproductive capacity and over the conditions of his blood-related environment. Safety here is identical with freedom. Beyond a certain level of intensity, mass-surveillance and investigatory powers legislation will destroy safety as freedom. Only when the law can guarantee the equitable distribution of family safety as freedom, it becomes all right for the spy to serve the public. Under any other circumstances, it is wrong, particularly now when we are entering an era of political transparency, or an era of less trust, if you like, in politicians.

<sup>27</sup> Both the processes of accumulation and refinement which energise our information society are running on small patterns (such as those queried by algorithms) which make us vulnerable to the psychopathy of One. The tendency towards One is manifested in the psychotic reaction of our society to acts of terror committed by a single individual.

<sup>28</sup> Only the sovereign can regulate the exception: 'Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.' Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty* (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 5.

<sup>29</sup> Gafa is an acronym for Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon. Most people, however, call them OSPs, meaning 'free' Online Service Providers – such as Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, AOL, Apple, LinkedIn, Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft. Since the rise of Web 2.0, OSPs have acquired a central role in the management of digital/internet information resources that are crucial for psychotic societies to thrive.



been blamed for two terror attacks in London – for Lee Rigby in 2013 and the Khalid Masood attack in 2017, respectively. This is a worrying development for it treats the internet as a hiding place for terrorists. Interestingly, we have seen how the demonization of internet is orchestrated by digital outsiders, that is, by people who are in positions of power but who are also technologically illiterate. The problem is that the most of the damage inflicted by the high levels of e-analphabetism among the political class occurs in the ordinary practice of outstanding members of the community who have had neither the time nor the attitude to do their homework in all matters related to the new digital world. Who is going to explain to these cyber-ignorami that they have got it wrong? Who is going to tell our legislators to stop treating the internet and its OSPs<sup>30</sup> as the enemy? Who is going to break the news to them about the uselessness of imposing intrusive surveillance and strict legislative measures?

Our psychotic society must develop programmes to counter the desires of its most gifted members to convince the technologically illiterate of the absolute necessity of snooping. Unfortunately, the majority of people believe in the promises of spy technologists and don't know anything about the cutting-edge pieces of legislation that facilitate and bolster their snooping operations. The public must understand what the terror threat is. And that this threat will go on and on unless people realise that they have to participate and intervene. Digital defectives are fit only for a life in politics. They seem to have survived in increasing numbers in the higher echelons of technologically advanced societies.

To stop terror, politicians need to recognise that a low-key, man-in-a-car, armed with a knife can be anyone. And that no amount of online surveillance and investigatory powers legislation is going to stop him. Surely, we want the security services to have the right resources. But they need to understand what is at stake: people's rights and freedoms. These have been gained through centuries of struggle. And we are not going to give them up that easily. From the Magna Carta in 1215 to the Petition of Right in 1628, from the US Declaration of Independence in 1776 to their Constitution and their Bill of Rights, from the Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1789 to the First Geneva Convention in 1864, from the Charter of the United Nations in 1945 to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, our most beautiful and generous pieces of legislation have been drafted with hope after the death of millions.

Is there a greater tragedy for democracy than that in our endeavour to shape our future according to the democratic ideals of our past, we should in fact unwittingly produce the very opposite of what we have been striving for? However tragic and horrendous an act of terror might be, it doesn't justify a paranoid change in the law unless it can be proven that it will help to reduce the likelihood of other similar attacks in the future; and to prove the existence of other similar yet absent attacks you have to prove that the killing wasn't an isolated incident. Giving the appearance of reality to something that simply isn't there is the ultimate psychotic act. Let us not surrender to the power of One.

## REFERENCES

- [1] @Snowden, *Twitter*, 9:59pm – 17 November 2016.
- [2] *Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act* (2001).
- [3] Arendt, Hannah. Introduction to *The Life of the Mind*, One-Volume Edition (San Diego, London & New York: Harcourt, 1978).
- [4] *A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department* [2004] UKHL 56.
- [5] Baudrillard, Jean. 'The Roots of Evil' in *The Agony of Power* (Los Angeles: Semotext (e) Intervention Series, 2011).
- [6] Bew J., Frampton M., Gurruchaga I., *Talking to Terrorists: Making Peace in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country* (London: C Hurst & Co Publishers, 2009).
- [7] *Comunicado urgente contra el despilfarro* (Comuna Antinacionalista Zamorana, Paris: Luis Manuel Rodriguez Editor, 1977).
- [8] English, Richard. *Does Terrorism Work? A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
- [9] *Draft Communications Data Bill* (2012).
- [10] *Draft Investigatory Bill* (2015).

---

<sup>30</sup> See note 29.

- [11] *Investigatory Powers Act* (2016).
- [12] Floridi, Luciano. 'Web 2.0 vs. The Semantic Web: A Philosophical Assessment' in *Episteme*, 6:1, February 2009, pp. 25-37.
- [13] Hill, R.K. 'What an algorithm is' in *Philosophy & Technology* 29:1, (2016), pp. 35-59.
- [14] *The Guardian* 2, 9 November 2015.
- [15] *The Guardian*, 1 April 2017.
- [16] *The Independent*, 10 December 2015.
- [17] Perez, Fred. 'Psychotic Society: An Introduction with a Glossary' in *International Journal of social Sciences and Humanities Research*, 5:1, pp. 403-418.
- [18] Powell, Jonathan. *Talking to Terrorists: How to End Armed Conflicts* (London: Penguin, 2014).
- [19] Schmitt, Carl. *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty* (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
- [20] 'The New MI6: less white and less like Bond' in *The Guardian*, 3 March 2017.
- [21] *The Times*, 28 October 2015.